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Abstract
This study develops a Schumpeterian growth model to analyze the
e¤ects of di¤erent patent instruments on innovation. We rst analyze
patent breadth that captures the traditional positive e¤ect of patent
rights on innovation. Then, we consider a prot-division rule between
entrants and incumbents. Given the division of prot, increasing the
share of prot assigned to incumbents reduces entrantsincentives for
innovation. This aspect of blocking patents captures the recently pro-
posed negative e¤ect of patent rights on innovation. Finally, blocking
patents generate a non-monotonic e¤ect on innovation when the step
size of innovation is endogenous due to a novel escape-infringement
e¤ect. Calibrating the model to aggregate data, we nd that a mar-
ginal increase in the blocking e¤ect of patent protection is likely to
raise economic growth.
JEL classication: O31, O34, O40
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1 Introduction
The traditional understanding is that secure patent rights enhance the pri-
vate return to R&D investment. According to this argument, stronger patent
rights should increase innovation and economic growth. However, many
economists, such as Bessen and Meurer (2008), Boldrin and Levin (2008) and
Ja¤e and Lerner (2004), have recently raised doubt against this traditional
viewpoint on patent protection. According to this recent argument, stronger
patent rights reduce innovation by increasing the power of existing patent
holders, who use their enhanced power to extract surplus from subsequent
innovators rather than providing more innovation. In this note, we develop a
Schumpeterian growth model to analyze the e¤ects of di¤erent patent instru-
ments on innovation and economic growth. The rst patent instrument that
we analyze is patent breadth that captures the traditional positive e¤ect of
patent rights on innovation. Then, we consider a prot-division rule between
entrants and incumbents. Given the division of prot, increasing the share of
prot assigned to incumbents reduces entrantsincentives for innovation, and
this aspect of blocking patents captures the recently proposed negative e¤ect
of patent rights on innovation. Finally, we show that blocking patents gen-
erate a non-monotonic e¤ect on innovation when the step size of innovation
is endogenous due to an escape-infringement e¤ect that is often neglected in
the patent literature.
Intuitively, in the presence of blocking patents, entrants would develop
more substantial innovations in order to avoid infringing the patents of in-
cumbents. Therefore, although blocking patents generate a negative e¤ect by
reducing the arrival rate of innovation, they also generate a positive e¤ect by
increasing the step size of innovation. Combining these positive and negative
e¤ects of blocking patents gives rise to an inverted-U relationship between
patent rights and innovation that has been documented in recent empirical
studies, such as Lerner (2009) and Qian (2007). We also calibrate the model
to aggregate data in order to quantify the e¤ect of blocking patents, and we
nd that a marginal increase in the blocking e¤ect of patent protection is
likely to raise economic growth.
This study relates to the microeconomic literature on optimal patent
design. In this literature, the seminal study is Nordhaus (1969), who shows
that the optimal patent length should balance between the social benet of
innovation and the social cost of monopolistic distortion. Scotchmer (2004)
provides a comprehensive review on the subsequent developments in this
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patent-design literature. In this literature, an interesting and important
policy lever is forward patent protection that gives rise to the division of
prot between sequential innovators; see Green and Scotchmer (1995) for an
early study. Our study di¤ers from studies in this literature by analyzing
the e¤ects of patent instruments on innovation and economic growth in a
quantitative dynamic general-equilibrium (DGE) framework.
As for the macroeconomic literature on patent policy, Judd (1985) pro-
vides the seminal DGE analysis on patent length, and he nds that an
innite patent length maximizes innovation. Subsequent studies nd that
strengthening patent rights via di¤erent patent instruments does not neces-
sarily increase innovation and may even stie it. Examples of these studies
include Horowitz and Lai (1996) and Chen and Iyigun (2010) on patent
length,1 ODonoghue and Zweimuller (2004) on forward patent protection
and patentability requirement, Akiyama and Furukawa (2009), Furukawa
(2007, 2010) and Horii and Iwaisako (2007) on patent protection against im-
itation, and Chu (2009) on blocking patents. Our study complements these
growth-theoretic studies by analyzing a novel channel through the escape-
infringement e¤ect that gives rise to a non-monotonic e¤ect of patent rights
on innovation and economic growth. Furthermore, we contrast the e¤ects of
blocking patents under an exogenous step size versus an endogenous step size
of innovation and show that the same patent instrument can have drastically
di¤erent e¤ects on innovation in di¤erent environments.
The rest of this note is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
Section 3 denes the equilibrium and characterizes the equilibrium alloca-
tion. Section 4 analyzes the e¤ects of patent instruments on innovation and
economic growth. The nal section concludes.
1Horowitz and Lai (1996) show that longer patent length increases the size of innovation
but delays the introduction of subsequent innovations. Although our model generates a
similar asymmetric e¤ect of patent rights on the size and frequency of innovation, the
underlying mechanism (i.e., overlapping patent rights and the escape-infringement e¤ect)
in our model is very di¤erent from Horowitz and Lai (1996).
3
2 The model
In this section, we consider a quality-ladder growth model as in Grossman
and Helpman (1991).2 To consider the division of prot between sequential
innovators along the quality ladder, we assume that each entrant (i.e., the
most recent innovator) infringes the patent of the incumbent (i.e., the pre-
vious innovator). As a result of this patent infringement, the entrant has
to transfer a share s 2 [0; 1] of her prot to the incumbent. However, with
sequential innovation, every innovators patent would eventually be infringed
by the next innovation, and she can then extract a share s of prot from the
next entrant. This formulation of prot division between sequential inno-
vators originates from ODonoghue and Zweimuller (2004), but our model
di¤ers from ODonoghue and Zweimuller (2004) by endogenizing s as a func-
tion of the step size of innovation in order to analyze the escape-infringement
e¤ect. To make the quality-ladder model more suitable for calibration, we
introduce capital accumulation into the model. Given that the Grossman-
Helpman model has been well-studied, we will describe the familiar features
briey to conserve space and discuss the new features in details.
2.1 Households
There is a unit continuum of identical households. Their lifetime utility is
U =
1Z
0
e t lnCtdt, (1)
where  > 0 is the discount rate, and Ct is the consumption of nal goods at
time t. Households maximize (1) subject to
:
At = rtAt +Wt   Ct. (2)
At is the value of assets (including capital and patents) owned by households,
and rt is the real rate of return on assets. Households inelastically supply one
unit of labor to earn the wage rateWt. The price of nal goods is normalized
to unity. From standard dynamic optimization, the Euler equation is
:
Ct=Ct = rt   . (3)
2See also Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Segerstrom et al. (1990) for other pioneering
studies on the quality-ladder growth model.
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2.2 Final goods
This sector is perfectly competitive. Final goods Yt are produced via a stan-
dard Cobb-Douglas aggregator given by
Yt = exp
0@ 1Z
0
lnXt(i)di
1A , (4)
where Xt(i) is intermediate goods i 2 [0; 1]. Competitive rms producing
nal goods take as given the output price and input prices Pt(i) for i 2 [0; 1].
From prot maximization, the conditional demand function for Xt(i) is
Xt(i) = Yt=Pt(i). (5)
2.3 Intermediate goods
In this sector, there is a continuum of di¤erentiated intermediate goods i 2
[0; 1]. Given the technology of the most recent innovator, the production
function of intermediate goods i is
Xt(i) = Qt(i)[Lx;t(i)]
1 [Kt(i)]. (6)
Qt(i) is the highest level of technology in industry i at time t, and it is given
by Qt(i) =
Qnt(i)
j=1 zj(i). The integer nt(i) is the number of innovations that
have occurred in industry i as of time t, and zj(i) > 1 is the step size of the
j-th innovation in industry i. If zj(i) = z for all j 2 f1; :::; nt(i)g and for
all i 2 [0; 1], then Qt(i) simplies to znt(i) as in the canonical quality-ladder
model. Given that the equilibrium features a symmetric step size z for all
j 2 f1; :::; nt(i)g and for all i 2 [0; 1], we use z to denote zj(i) for notational
simplicity.
Lx;t(i) and Kt(i) are respectively the number of production workers and
the amount of capital employed in industry i at time t. From cost minimiza-
tion, the marginal cost of production for the industry leader (i.e., the most
recent innovator) in industry i is
MCt(i) =
1
Qt(i)

Wt
1  
1 
Rt


, (7)
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where Rt is the rental price of capital. The standard no-arbitrage condition
is Rt = rt + , where  is the depreciation rate of capital. Given MCt(i),
the industry leader charges a markup over the marginal cost to maximize
prot. In the canonical quality-ladder model, this markup is given by the
step size z due to Bertrand competition. Here we consider patent breadth
similar to Li (2001) and Goh and Olivier (2002) by assuming that the markup
 > 1 is a policy instrument chosen by the patent authority. Therefore, the
monopolistic price is given by
Pt(i) = MCt(i). (8)
As a result, the amount of prot generated in industry i is
t(i) =

  1


Pt(i)Xt(i) =

  1


Yt, (9)
where the second equality of (9) follows from (5). Furthermore, labor income
in industry i is
WtLx;t(i) =

1  


Pt(i)Xt(i) =

1  


Yt. (10)
In each industry i, the most recent innovator (i.e., the entrant) infringes
the patent of the previous innovator (i.e., the incumbent). As a result of
this patent infringement, the most recent innovator pays a licensing fee by
transferring a share s 2 [0; 1] of her prot to the previous innovator. Here we
di¤er from ODonoghue and Zweimuller (2004) by considering an endogenous
prot-division rule given by s = =z, where the patent instrument  2 [0; z]
captures the negative e¤ect of blocking patents. For a given z, a larger 
forces the entrant to pay a higher licensing fee to the incumbent and hence
reduces the entrants incentives for innovation. However, the entrant can
reduce the amount of this licensing fee by developing a more substantial
innovation through a larger step size z. This setup is reasonable because in
reality, the more di¤erent an innovation is from previous innovations, the less
likely that it would be considered as an infringement. Given a lower chance
of patent infringement, the entrant would have more power to bargain for a
lower licensing fee. Due to prot division, the entrant obtains (1 s)t while
the incumbent obtains st. The most recent innovation and the second-most
recent innovation are owned by di¤erent rms due to the well-known Arrow
replacement e¤ect.3
3See Cozzi (2007) for an interesting discussion on the Arrow e¤ect.
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2.4 R&D and innovation
Denote V2;t(i) as the value of the patent on the second-most recent innovation
in industry i. Because t(i) = t for i 2 [0; 1] from (9), V2;t(i) = V2;t in a
symmetric equilibrium that features an equal arrival rate of innovation across
industries.4 The familiar no-arbitrage condition for V2;t is
rtV2;t = st +
:
V 2;t   tV2;t. (11)
Equation (11) equates the interest rate rt to the asset return per unit of
asset. The asset return is given by the sum of (a) the prot st received by
the patent holder, (b) the capital gain
:
V 2;t , and (c) the expected capital loss
tV2;t due to creative destruction for which t is the Poisson arrival rate of
innovation. As for the value of the patent on the most recent innovation, the
no-arbitrage condition for V1;t is
rtV1;t = (1  s)t +
:
V 1;t   t(V1;t   V2;t). (12)
The intuition behind (12) is the same as (11) except for the last term. When
the next innovation occurs, the current industry leader becomes the second-
most recent innovator and hence her net capital loss is V1;t   V2;t.
There is a unit continuum of R&D entrepreneurs indexed by k 2 [0; 1],
and each entrepreneur hires R&D labor Lr;t(k) for innovation. The expected
return from R&D is
r;t(k) = t(k)V1;t  WtLr;t(k). (13)
The arrival rate of innovation for entrepreneur k is
t(k) =
'Lr;t(k)
z
, (14)
where ' > 0 is a productivity parameter for R&D, and '=z captures the
e¤ect that a larger step size of innovation has a lower chance of success. The
zero-expected-prot condition for R&D is
'V1;t
z
= Wt. (15)
4We follow the standard approach in the literature to focus on the symmetric equilib-
rium. See Cozzi et al. (2007) for a theoretical justication for the symmetric equilibrium
as the unique rational-expectation equilibrium in the quality-ladder model.
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For the rest of this study, we focus on the balanced growth path. In this
case, (11) becomes
V2 =
s
r   g +  =
s
+ 
, (16)
where g is the steady-state growth rate of prot, and the second equality of
(16) follows from (3).5 Similarly, (12) becomes
V1 =
(1  s)
+ 
+
V2
+ 
. (17)
An entrepreneur takes  and V2 as given. Given that the step size z is
endogenous, she chooses z to maximize
'V1
z
=
'
z

(1  s)
+ 
+
V2
+ 

, (18)
where s = =z.6 This optimization yields the equilibrium step size given by
z = 

2+ 
+ 

. (19)
It is useful to note that the equilibrium arrival rate  is also a function of
. To ensure that z > 1 in equilibrium, we impose the following condition.
Condition B (blocking patents): 

2+ ()
+ ()

> 1.
In Section 4, we will show that z is strictly increasing in  even after taking
into account the general-equilibrium e¤ect on , so that there exists a lower-
bound value of  above which Condition B holds. Equation (19) yields an
important insight that increasing the blocking e¤ect  of patent protection
causes the innovators to develop more substantial innovations in order to
escape patent infringement. In equilibrium, the prot-division rule under an
endogenous step size of innovation becomes
s =

z
=
+ 
2+ 
. (20)
5It is useful to note that consumption, output and prot all grow at the same rate on
the balanced growth path.
6It is useful to note that the s in V2 is not chosen by the entrepreneur (but by the next
innovator instead).
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3 Decentralized equilibrium
The equilibrium is a time path of allocations fCt; Yt; Xt(i); Kt; Lx;t; Lr;tg1t=0
and a time path of prices fPt(i);Wt; Rt; rt; V1;t; V2;tg1t=0. Also, at each instant
of time,
 households maximize utility taking fWt; rtg as given;
 competitive nal-goods rms produce Yt and maximize prot taking
Pt(i) as given;
 monopolistic intermediate-goods rms employ fLx;t; Ktg to produce
Xt(i) and choose Pt(i) to maximize prot taking fWt; Rtg as given;
 R&D entrepreneurs employ Lr;t to maximize expected prot taking
fWt; V1;tg as given;
 the labor market clears such that Lx;t + Lr;t = 1;
 the nal-goods market clears such that Yt = Ct+ It, where It is capital
investment;
 the capital stock accumulates according to
:
Kt = It   Kt.
3.1 Equilibrium allocation
To derive the equilibrium allocation, we combine (10) and (15) to obtain
'V1
z
= W =

1  


Yt
Lx
. (21)
Then, we substitute (9), (16) and (17) into (21) and rearrange terms to obtain
'
z

(1  s) +


+ 

s

  1
+ 
=
1  
Lx
, (22)
where z and s are given by (19) and (20). Using Lx = 1 Lr and  = 'Lr=z
from (14), we can re-express (22) as
'(+ ) = 

(1  )(2+ )
2
  1 +  (2+ )

. (23)
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Equation (23) determines the steady-state equilibrium arrival rate  of in-
novation. Both the left-hand side (LHS) and the right-hand side (RHS) of
(23) are increasing in . To ensure that the equilibrium  is strictly positive,
we impose a lower bound on the R&D-productivity parameter ' given by
Condition R (R&D productivity): ' > 4(1  )=(  1).
Given Condition R, LHSj=0 = ' > 4(1   )2=(   1) = RHSj=0.
Furthermore, LHS is a linear and increasing function in  while RHS is a
convex and increasing function in . Therefore, RHS crosses LHS exactly
once from below giving rise to a unique equilibrium ; see Figure 1 for
an illustration. Solving the quadratic equation in (23) yields a closed-form
solution for  given by
 = +
s
2 +

  

'(  1)

  4(1  )

, (24)
where   ['(  1)=(2)  (+ 1  2) ] =( ) is a composite parame-
ter.
4 E¤ects of patents on innovation and growth
In this section, we analyze the e¤ects of the two patent instruments f; g
on innovation and economic growth. We begin by deriving the steady-state
equilibrium growth rates of output and technology. Substituting (6) into (4)
yields
Yt = Zt(Lx)
1 (Kt), (25)
where the aggregate level of technology is dened as
Zt  exp
0@ 1Z
0
lnQt(i)di
1A = exp
0@ 1Z
0
nt(i)di ln z

1A . (26)
The second equality of (26) applies zj(i) = z so that Qt(i) = (z)nt(i).
Applying the law of large numbers, the log of Zt becomes
lnZt =
tZ
0
d ln z
. (27)
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Therefore, the steady-state equilibrium growth rate of technology is
g 
:
Zt
Zt
=  ln z. (28)
On the balanced growth path, Yt and Kt grow at g=(1  ).
The rst patent instrument that we analyze is patent breadth . An
increase in  shifts down RHS of (23) causing  to increase. Intuitively, a
larger patent breadth enables the industry leader to charge a higher markup,
and this larger monopolistic power increases the amount of prots as well as
providing more incentives for R&D and innovation. This is the traditional
positive e¤ect of patent protection emphasized by proponents of intellectual
property rights. The higher arrival rate of innovation also increases the equi-
librium growth rate g if  is su¢ ciently large. To see this result,
@g
@
= ln z + 
@ ln z
@| {z }
<0
= ln  + ln

2+ 
+ 

  

(2+ )(+ )
. (29)
Then, using log approximation ln(1 + x)  x, we can show that
ln

2+ 
+ 

 
+ 
>

(2+ )(+ )
. (30)
Therefore, if  > 1 (i.e., ln  > 0), then @g=@ > 0.
Proposition 1 The arrival rate of innovation is increasing in patent breadth
. If  > 1, then economic growth is also increasing in patent breadth .
The second patent instrument that we analyze is the e¤ect of blocking
patents captured by . However, we rst analyze its e¤ect under an exogenous
step size of innovation. In this case, z = z > 1 and s = =z, where z is a
constant. Furthermore, (22) can be re-expressed as
(  1)

1  
z

+ 

=
(1  )(+ )2
'=z    , (31)
It can be shown that Figure 1 also applies to (31). A larger  shifts down
LHS of (31). As a result,  decreases, and this lower arrival arrival rate of
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innovation also decreases the equilibrium growth rate g because z is assumed
to be exogenous in this case. Intuitively, a larger e¤ect of blocking patents
forces entrants to transfer a larger share of prot to incumbents reducing the
entrantsincentives for R&D and innovation. This is the recently emphasized
negative e¤ect of patent protection emphasized by opponents of intellectual
property rights.
Proposition 2 Under an exogenous step size z, the arrival rate of innova-
tion and economic growth are decreasing in the blocking e¤ect  of patents.
Finally, we analyze blocking patents under an endogenous step size of
innovation. In this case, z and s are given by (19) and (20). A larger
 induces innovators to choose a larger step size z for a given , but this
larger step size also reduces the equilibrium arrival rate of innovation due
to lower R&D productivity '=z. In (23), an increase in  shifts up RHS,
so that  has a negative e¤ect on  as in the case of exogenous step size.
However, with endogenous step size, the larger z chosen by innovators also
contributes to economic growth. In other words, an increase in  has a
negative e¤ect on g through  (i.e., the frequency of innovation) as well as
a positive e¤ect through z (i.e., the size of innovation). To our knowledge,
this additional escape-infringement e¤ect of blocking patents has never been
analyzed in the patent literature. It is this novel mechanism that gives rise
to a non-monotonic e¤ect of blocking patents on innovation.
Di¤erentiating g =  ln z with respect to  yields
@g
@
= ln z
@
@|{z}
<0
+ 
@ ln z
@
, (32)
where
@ ln z
@
=
1

  
(+ )(2+ )
@
@
> 0. (33)
Therefore, the equilibrium step size z is strictly increasing in  even after
taking into account the general-equilibrium e¤ect on . Equations (32) and
(33) show that there are both positive and negative e¤ects of blocking patents
on economic growth. On the one hand, if  is su¢ ciently large, the negative
e¤ect dominates the positive e¤ect such that @g=@ < 0. As  approaches
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its upper bound '(  1)=[4(1 )], Condition R becomes an equality, and
hence,  approaches zero; in this case, the negative e¤ect dominates the
positive e¤ect. On the other hand, if  is su¢ ciently small, the positive
e¤ect dominates the negative e¤ect such that @g=@ > 0. As  approaches
its lower bound given by Condition B, z approaches one, and hence, the
positive e¤ect dominates the negative e¤ect in this case. The opposite signs
of @g=@ at the upper and lower bounds of  imply that g must be a
non-monotonic function in . For the special case of ! 0, (23) yields
lim
!0
 =

  1
  

'

. (34)
Therefore, the equilibrium growth rate becomes
lim
!0
g =

  1
  

' ln 

. (35)
In this case, g is explicitly an inverted-U function in  and reaches a max-
imum at  =   exp(1). Finally, we have conducted a large number of
numerical simulations for the general case of  > 0 and found that g is
always an inverted-U function in .
Proposition 3 Under the endogenous step size z, the arrival rate of in-
novation is decreasing in , but the step size of innovation is increasing in
. Therefore, blocking patents generate a non-monotonic e¤ect on economic
growth.
4.1 Quantitative analysis
In this section, we calibrate the model to quantify the blocking e¤ect  of
patent protection on innovation and economic growth. There are ve struc-
tural parameters f; ; ; '; g that are relevant for this numerical exercise.
First, we set the discount rate  and the capital-share parameter  to their
standard values of 0:04 and 0:3 respectively. Then, we use three empirical
moments to calibrate the remaining three parameters. Using (10) and (22),
we can express R&D expenditure as a share of GDP as
Sr  WLr
Y
=

  1


(1  s) +


+ 

s


+ 
, (36)
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where s is given by (20). In the US, Sr is about 0.025. Then, we use (24)
to set the arrival rate  of innovation to 0:33 so that the expected duration
between arrivals of innovation is 3 years as in Acemoglu and Akcigit (2009).
Finally, we use (28) to set the growth rate g of total factor productivity
(TFP) to a standard value of 0:015 for the US economy. These three empirical
moments pin down the values of f; '; g = f1:03; 9:71; 0:94g.
Given these calibrated parameter values, we perform a counterfactual
exercise by increasing  to examine whether strengthening the blocking e¤ect
of patent protection would increase or decrease economic growth. The result
is reported in Figure 2. In Figure 2, we see that  = 0:94 is on the upward-
sloping side of the curve, and this nding is robust to varying the parameter
values within a reasonable range. In our sensitivity analysis, we nd that
 is on the downward-sloping side of the curve only when we consider an
extremely low arrival rate  of less than 0.05, which implies an expected
duration between innovation arrivals of more than 20 years. The intuition is
as follows. From (28),  = g= ln z; therefore, for a given TFP growth rate
g, a lower arrival rate  of innovation must be accompanied by a larger step
size z, which in turn implies a larger . Although the literature does not
provide a precise estimate for , the expected duration between innovation
arrivals should be less than 20 years. Therefore, we conclude that a marginal
increase in the blocking e¤ect of patent protection is likely to raise economic
growth when we account for the escape-infringement e¤ect.
5 Conclusion
In this note, we have analyzed the e¤ects of di¤erent patent instruments on
innovation and economic growth. We nd that whether stronger patent rights
stimulate or stie innovation depends on the underlying patent instrument.
While patent breadth has a positive e¤ect on innovation, blocking patents
generate a negative e¤ect on innovation under an exogenous step size of inno-
vation. However, the e¤ect of blocking patents on innovation and economic
growth becomes non-monotonic once we allow for an endogenous step size
of innovation, and this non-monotonic e¤ect of patent rights on innovation
is consistent with the nding of recent empirical studies. Finally, calibrating
the model to aggregate data, we nd that a marginal increase in the blocking
e¤ect of patent protection is likely to stimulate economic growth.
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Figure 2: Effects of blocking patents on growth
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Figure 1: Equilibrium arrival rate of innovation 
